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Charity begins at the politically correct home? 
The Family First case
Rex Tauati Ahdar*
I Introduction
Is advancing the traditional or nuclear family uncharitable? Is it 
“controversial” and impermissibly political “propaganda” in the 21st 
century to advocate the two-parent, opposite-sex, married couple as 
the optimal domestic configuration in which to have and raise children? 
The Charities Registration Board (NZ) thought so and deregistered 
the organisation that had the temerity to advance it: Family First New 
Zealand. 
It is not as though deregistration is an infrequent occurrence. There are 
a huge number of charities in New Zealand: 27,072, that have a combined 
income of $16.41 billion.1 But just as some charities bloom, others are 
scythed down if they fail to bear fruit. In 2013 the Inland Revenue 
reported that 3,902 charities had been deregistered since the Charities 
Register had been opened in February 2007.2 This means around 15 per 
cent, or some one in six, of the then around 26,000 charities were axed.3
Back to the case at hand: it needed an expensive appeal to the High 
Court for Family First,4 an outspoken conservative entity, to ensure that 
its deregistration as a charity was revisited. This article examines the 
Family First deregistration decision and, although it is hardly a landmark 
case, its significance, I suggest, lies as a particularly clear example of 
official institutional antipathy towards the conservative political and 
religious understanding of domestic personal relations.
II Background to the Family First New Zealand Appeal
The Family First New Zealand Trust (FF) was created in 2006 and FF 
was also incorporated under the Charitable Trusts Act 1957 in that same 
year. FF’s purposes include “to promote and advance research and policy 
supporting marriage and family as foundational to a strong and enduring 
society.”5 The next year it was registered under the Charities Act 2005.6 
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1 Charities Services (located within the Department of Internal Affairs) 
website: <https://charities.govt.nz/> (as at 14 October 2015).
2 Susan Barker, “Deregistered charities” [2014] NZLJ 87 at 87.
3 At 87.
4 Re Family First New Zealand Ltd [2015] NZHC 1493, (2015) 27 NZTC 22-017 
(HC) (“Family First”).
5 At [3].
6 Number CC 10094, registered on 21 March 2007.
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The Charities Commission in 2009 reviewed FF’s operations to determine 
if it still warranted its charitable status and a year later concluded it 
did.7 A restructuring of charity regulation in 2012 saw the Charities 
Registration Board (Charities Board) and the Department of Internal 
Affairs replace the Commission. The Charities Board comprises three 
persons who “must act independently in exercising [their] professional 
judgement”.8
In September 2012, the Department recommended to the Charities 
Board that FF be removed from the Charities Register. In the Department’s 
view, FF had succumbed to advocating a political viewpoint. On 15 April 
2013, the Board resolved to deregister FF.9  Family First duly appealed and 
the High Court, on 17 June 2013, granted an interim order under s 60 of 
the Charities Act allowing FF to stay registered pending the outcome of a 
Supreme Court judgment in the Greenpeace case. This important decision 
was delivered on 6 August 2014.10  The Supreme Court decision – on, 
in my opinion, any reasonable and non-tortured reading – called for a 
prompt reconsideration of the FF deregistration and, equally I suggest, 
FF’s eventual reinstatement. But this did not happen:11
The Charities Board recognised the Supreme Court’s judgment in 
Greenpeace introduced changes to the law concerning the charitable status 
of entities that have a political purpose. However, the Charities Board 
believed it could not reconsider its decision concerning Family First unless 
Family First’s appeal was allowed and the Charities Board directed to 
reconsider its decision.
So, and this bears emphasis, despite having the benefit of the Supreme 
Court’s unusually clear ruling, the Charities Board put FF to the expense12 
and stress of seeing through the appeal to the High Court lodged a year 
earlier, winning its case and only then – once the Board had been ordered 
to do so by the Court – would it reconsider its original deregistration 
decision. The Board, ex abuntanti cautela, might have thought that it 
had no power to reconsider FF’s eligibility for registration without first 
7 Family First, above n 4, at [6]–[7].
8 Charities Act 2005, s 8(4)(a). The Chairman, Mr Roger Holmes Miller, is a 
Wellington lawyer and Registered Trustee, whose specialisations include 
trust law and governance. Ms Caren Rangi is a chartered accountant 
and audit specialist from Napier. Mr Simon Karipa is currently General 
Counsel for Te Ohu Kaimoana (the Māori Fisheries Trust): <https://
www.charities.govt.nz/about-charities-services/charities-registration-
board/>.
9 Deregistration decision: Family First New Zealand, Charities Board (CC 
42358), Decision No D2013-1, 15 April 2013 (“Board”): <https://charities.
govt.nz/charities-in-new-zealand/legal-decisions/view-the-decisions/
view/family-first-new-zealand>.
10 Re Greenpeace of New Zealand Inc [2014] NZSC 105, [2015] 1 NZLR 169.
11 Family First, above n 4, at [74].
12 The legal cost for the Board to take the Family First case to court was 
$32,894 (not including GST): letter from Charities Services, Internal Affairs 
(on file with author).
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receiving a green light in the form of a court ruling. The appeal against 
deregistration having already been lodged, the Board might have 
believed it was best to see the matter run its course. 
The Act, on my reading, is simply silent on when, how, and under what 
circumstances, a reconsideration takes place. There is brief mention of the 
Board’s duties in respect of assessing a new application for registration 
from a deregistered charity.13 But there is no express provision permitting 
the Board to reconsider a yet-to-be-implemented decision to deregister 
a charitable entity. By the same token, neither is there any provision 
preventing it from doing so. There is a hint that unnecessary formalities 
are not to be generated: s 19(3) states that “the Board is not required to 
follow a formal process” when it evaluates an originating application 
for registration as a charity. Logic would suggest the same approach 
be followed for reconsideration of determinations to expunge existing 
charities and, for that matter, fresh applications by a deregistered entity.
To return to the legislative scheme more generally, under the Charities 
Act 2005 a trust qualifies for registration if it derives income for charitable 
purposes (s 13) and the Act adopts the venerable statement of Lord 
Macnaghten in Pemsel:14
5. Meaning of charitable purpose and effect of ancillary non-charitable 
purpose
(1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, charitable 
purpose includes every charitable purpose, whether it relates to 
the relief of poverty, the advancement of education or religion, or 
any other matter beneficial to the community. 
The section goes on to provide that any non-charitable purpose that is 
merely ancillary to the charitable one is not fatal.
(3) To avoid doubt, if the purposes of a trust, society, or an institution 
include a non-charitable purpose (for example, advocacy) that is 
merely ancillary to a charitable purpose of the trust, society, or 
institution, the presence of that non-charitable purpose does not 
prevent the trustees of the trust, the society, or the institution from 
qualifying for registration as a charitable entity.  
(4) For the purposes of subsection (3), a non-charitable purpose is 
ancillary to a charitable purpose of the trust, society, or institution 
if the non-charitable purpose is – 
(a) ancillary, secondary, subordinate, or incidental to a 
charitable purpose of the trust, society, or institution; and  
(b)  not an independent purpose of the trust, society, or 
institution.  
13 Charities Act 2005, s 31(4).
14 Commissioners for Special Purposes of the Income Tax v Pemsel [1891] AC 531 
at 583.
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In determining an entity’s purposes, its activities must also be taken into 
account, to the extent that the latter assists in evaluating:15
(1) the meaning of a stated purpose where the stated purpose is 
capable of bearing more than one meaning;
 
 




(3) whether the entity’s purposes provide a benefit to the public;
 
and 
(4) whether a non-charitable purpose falls within the saving 
provisions of s 5(3) of the Charities Act.16
The deregistration of a body cannot occur unless the Board is satisfied 
that it is “in the public interest” to do so.17
The Board, in concluding that FF was a candidate for deregistration 
(primarily on the basis that it was engaged in political advocacy) was 
“heavily influenced”18  by the Court of Appeal judgment19 in Greenpeace.
III The Charities Board Decision
Deregistration was, according to the Board’s analysis, justified on three 
bases.
First, it held that FF’s main purpose was to “promote points of view 
about family life” and this was a non-charitable political purpose lacking 
a self-evident public benefit.20 Second, FF had an independent purpose to 
procure government action consistent with FF’s stance, and this purpose 
was a non-charitable, political one that was not ancillary to any valid 
charitable purpose. Third, FF’s purpose to advance its views about family 
life was not a charitable purpose of an educational or religious nature, 
nor was it beneficial to the public within the fourth category of charity.
A	 Political	 purposes	 that	 are	 not	 self-evidently	 beneficial	 to	 the	
public21
The Board suggested that there are three types of political purposes 
excluded from the notion of a charity:22 furthering the interests of a 
particular political party; purposes to procure governmental actions 
(including through legislation); and, thirdly, purposes “to promote a 
point of view, the public benefit of which is not self evident as a matter 
of law.”23
15 Charities Act 2005, s 18(3)(a)(i)(ii).
16 Family First, above n 4, at [24].
17 Charities Act 2005, s 35(1).
18 Family First, above n 4, at [39].
19 Re Greenpeace of New Zealand Inc [2012] NZCA 533, [2013] 1 NZLR 339.
20 Board, above n 9, at [32]. 
21 See generally Juliet Chevalier-Watts Law of Charity (Thompson Reuters, 
Wellington, 2014) at § 7.5.




The Board focused upon the third kind of excluded political purpose. 
Careful parsing of the FAQ section of FF’s website on what it meant by 
“family” revealed that this organisation strongly supported the “natural 
family”, that is: 24
... the union of a man and a woman through marriage for the purposes of 
sharing love and joy, raising children, providing their moral education, 
building a vital home economy, offering security in times of trouble, and 
binding the generations.
FF affirmed “the marital union to be the authentic sexual bond”, “the 
sanctity of human life from conception to death”, “the complementarity 
of the sexes is a source of strength” amongst other propositions in an 
11 item list. FF’s stance on families was, said the Board,  “an opinion or 
value judgment.”25 In a key passage we learn that:26
The Board also considers that the Trust’s perspective on family is one 
that is controversial in the relevant sense, ie that its benefit to the public is 
not self-evident as a matter of law. The Board considers it can be taken as 
a given that there is no relevant self-evident benefit to specific positions 
on conscience issues such as procreation outside of marriage (point 6), 
the definition of marriage as a union between a man and woman (point 
2), the sanctity of life from conception to death (point 7). Moreover, the 
Board considers that the Trust’s [ie, FF’s] opinion that the government 
must shelter and encourage the “natural family” (point 8); its opinions 
regarding the consequences of the demise of the “natural family” [viz 
“moral and political failure” resulting in “poverty, starvation and 
environmental decay”] (points 5 and 9); its prescription for the role of 
men and women in family life (point 10) and its advocacy against an 
individual rights perspective [viz “the natural family, not the individual, is 
the fundamental social unit”] (point 1) are fairly described as controversial 
in contemporary New Zealand society.
Further careful website investigation revealed “the controversial 
nature of the Trust’s advocacy for ‘the natural family’”27 – this position 
being starkly apparent from another long list of policies it promoted to 
politicians. These policies included those to: “protect marriage in law as 
one man-one woman”, “end discrimination against stay-home parents”, 
“amend section 59 [of the Crimes Act 1961] to decriminalise parents who 
use light smacking for correction of children”, “promote married couple 
adoption”, “oppose euthanasia”, “criminalise the act of pimping and 
brothel keeping”, “reduce the availability of pornography” and so on.28
The Board rejected the submission that FF’s agenda accorded with the 
international and domestic law concerning family life and children’s 
rights. “Neither New Zealand’s international law obligations nor New 
24 Point No 2 in FF’s lengthy 11-fold answer to the FAQ “What do you mean 
by family?”: at [44].
25 Board, above n 9, at [45].
26 At [46] (emphasis added).
27 At [47].
28 At [47].
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Zealand’s domestic law”, it maintained, “favour ‘the natural family’ 
over other forms of family.”29
The Charities Board was incorrect, at least with respect to the 
international position. Beginning with the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights 1948, the UN has consistently assumed the traditional or 
natural family in its conventions that mention the “family”.30 Article 1(3) 
of the Declaration states that “the family is the natural and fundamental 
group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the 
State.” And as for what is a family, art 16(1) strongly implies that it is the 
traditional nuclear one. That article reads: “Men and women of full age … 
have the right to marry and to found a family.” It could hardly be clearer. 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 reiterates 
these propositions.31 Later Resolutions (not, be it noted, Conventions) 
have admittedly proffered more inclusive and broader concepts of the 
“family in its various forms”.32
This year, on 3 July 2015, the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva 
passed a resolution on the Protection of the Family.33 The Resolution:34
Reaffirms that the family is the natural and fundamental group unit of 
society and is entitled to protection by society and the State,
Notes with concern that the contribution of the family in society and in the 
achievement of development goals continues to be largely overlooked 
and underemphasized, and recognizing the potential of the family to 
contribute to national development and to the achievement of major goals 
of every society… including the eradication of poverty and the creation 
of just, stable and secure societies.
The resolution was passed by 29 votes to 14, with 4 abstentions. Those 
nations in the minority include Western countries, such as the US, France, 
29 At [48].
30 This phrase was used by the UN in the International Conference on 
Population and Development, Cairo (1994), UN Doc A/CONF 171/13 
(1994) at ¶5.1.  See Maria S Aguirre and Ann Wolfgram “United Nations 
Policy and the Family: Redefining the Ties that Bind” (2002) 16 BYU J 
Public Law 113.
31 ICCPR 1966, art 23: “(1) The family is the natural and fundamental group 
unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State. 
(2) The right of men and women of marriageable age to marry and to 
found a family shall be recognized.” 
32 See Aguirre and Wolfgram, above n 30, at 116 ff.
33 A/HRC/29/L 25.
34 Above (original emphasis).
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Germany and the UK, with “liberal” or “progressive”35 (for want of more 
accurate epithets) agendas to advance, inter alia, wider notions of the 
family and the promotion of reproductive and LGBT rights.36
On the domestic front, however, the Charities Board was on firmer 
ground. The recognition of other forms of family beyond the traditional 
nuclear one is a well documented phenomenon. As Professor Mark 
Henaghan summarises:37
current legal policy on the concept of the family is moving from a 
primarily moral [traditional married nuclear family] view to a much 
greater recognition of a wide variety of family relationships. This means 
a significantly wider variety of relationships have been given legal status 
and recognition by family law legislation in recent times. The primary 
driving force behind this change is the idea of equality as expressed in 
anti-discrimination law. This concept of equality assumes that personal 
relationship are essential the same, and for that reason should be treated 
the same… 
B Independent purpose to procure government action
FF had the purpose to procure governmental action reflecting its views.38 
Propaganda directed to private individuals and corporations to advance 
charitable objects is permissible, whereas that directed to political actors, 
such as Members of Parliament, is not.39 The Board considered that FF’s 
stated purposes and activities pointed towards an independent or stand-
alone purpose to procure political actions. The calls for governmental 
action were “pervasive through the Trust’s overall endeavour.”40
C	 Purposes	that	were	not	religious,	educational	or	beneficial	to	the	
public
1 Advancement of religion
FF failed under this category of charitable purpose. The fact that only 
religious persons could be trustees and that the Trust stated on its website 
35 On the definition of “liberal” see eg Roger Scruton The Palgrave Macmillan 
Dictionary of Political Thought (3rd ed, Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 
2007) at 394: “In US popular usage, ‘liberal’ means left-liberal, and is 
expressly contrasted with ‘conservative’. In this usage a liberal is one who 
leans consciously towards the under-privileged, supports the causes of 
minorities and socially excluded groups, believes in the use of state power 
to achieve social justice, usually in the form of welfare programmes, and 
in all probability shares the egalitarian and secular values of the modern, 
and maybe those of the postmodern world-view.” On the meaning of 
“progressive”, see Scruton ibid at 561.
36 “A new global force is fighting liberal social mores”, The Economist, 
11 July 2015.
37 “Legally defining the family” in Mark Hengahan and Bill Atkin (eds) 
Family Law Policy in New Zealand (4 th ed, LexisNexis NZ, Wellington, 
2013) 1 at 5.
38 Board, above n 9, at [95]–[96] and [100].
39 At [93].
40 At [100].
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that it spoke “from a family friendly perspective with an emphasis 
on the Judeo-Christian values which have benefited New Zealand 
for generations” were not sufficient.41 These factors demonstrated the 
Trust may have “a connection with, be motivated by or be conducive to 
[religion]”42, but that is not enough. On that reasoning, the Society for the 
Protection of the Unborn Child (now renamed Voice for Life) has failed 
to meet the criteria for this head of charity.43 (FF did not challenge this 
conclusion on appeal.)
2 Advancement of education
FF is very active in publishing and disseminating its opinion through 
its website and media releases. It hosts an annual “New Zealand Forum 
on the Family” and commissions polls on issues and solicits research 
on subject dear to its heart.44 The Board considered that FF’s website 
publications were “predominantly opinion pieces”45. FF’s commissioned 
research papers constituted  “propaganda for the points of view 
promoted by the Trust.”46 The reports did not, for instance, present 
original research nor provide a balanced and rigorous literature review.47
3	 Other	purposes	beneficial	to	the	community
Within this broad category FF argued its work aimed to improve the 
moral and spiritual welfare of the community. But having found that 
FF’s purpose was a political one (“to promote a specific model of family 
life”48) this, according to the Board, ruled out it being charitable under 
the moral and spiritual improvement category.49
Could FF bring itself under the promotion of good citizenship 
umbrella? Again, the Board said no. FF’s purpose and activities were “to 
promote a controversial point of view rather than to facilitate balanced 
and informed debate of public issues.”50 In another passage it chided that 
where an entity’s contributions to public debate “simply reflect a specific 
position and do not advance education or reflect rigorous standards of 
objective analysis and factual research”51 it would not pass muster. 
IV The High Court Appeal
We have seen that the gravamen of the Board’s deregistration decision 
was that FF’s purposes and activities were political. The Board had duly 
41 At [57].
42 Liberty Trust v Charities Commission [2011] NZHC 577, [2011] 3 NZLR 68 
at [94].
43 Molloy v CIR [1981] 1 NZLR 668 (CA).









followed the Court of Appeal in Greenpeace which, it will be recalled, 
had held that, inter alia, political activities and controversial objects 
were fatal to charitable status. To be fair then, the Board was adhering 
to the law as it was.
A Political purpose and controversial views
The majority of the Supreme Court in Greenpeace reversed the Court of 
Appeal’s stance on matters political. It stated: “charitable and political 
purposes are not mutually exclusive in all cases: a blanket exclusion 
is unnecessary and distracts from the underlying inquiry whether 
a purpose is of public benefit within the sense the law recognises as 
charitable.”52 Accordingly, Collins J in Family First held: 53
The Charities Board’s decision was based upon a fundamental legal 
proposition that has subsequently been found to be incorrect. The 
Charities Board’s view that political purposes could not be charitable 
underpinned its decision. In view of the Supreme Court’s explanation 
that political purposes are not irreconcilable with charitable purposes, it 
is appropriate for the Charities Board to reconsider the position of Family 
First in light of the Supreme Court’s judgment. 
The Supreme Court majority in Greenpeace was also adamant that the 
so-called controversial nature of the views or purposes espoused by 
the entity was not, as the Court of Appeal had held, a bar to the law’s 
recognition of it as a charity: 54
We are unable to agree with the Court of Appeal suggestion that views 
generally acceptable may be charitable, while those which are highly 
controversial are not. In Molloy the existence of public controversy 
over abortion helped explain why maintaining the legal status quo on 
abortion could not be assumed to serve the public benefit in the way the 
law regards as charitable. But the more general emphasis on controversy 
taken from it may  be misplaced. It is reminiscent of the suggestion by 
Lord Wright in National Anti-Vivisection Society that “intangible benefit” 
which is charitable is that “approv[ed] by the common understanding of 
enlightened opinion for the time being”. Such thinking would effectively 
exclude much promotion of change while favouring charitable status 
on the basis of majoritarian assessment and the status quo. Just as 
unpopularity of causes otherwise charitable	should	not	affect	 their	charitable	
status, we do not think that lack of controversy could be determinative. We 
consider that the Court of Appeal was wrong to place such emphasis in 
the present case on the acceptance in New Zealand legislation and society 
52 Greenpeace, above n 10, at [3] and [74] per Elias CJ, McGrath and 
Glazebrook JJ.  William Young and Arnold JJ dissented. At [127] they 
state: “the position that political advocacy is not charitable is reasonably 
defensible not only on the basis of the authorities but also as a matter of 
policy and practicality.”
53 Family First, above n 4, at [84].
54 Greenpeace, above n 10, at [75] (emphasis added). The Lord Wright 
quotation is from National Anti-Vivisection Society v Inland Revenue 
Commissioners [1948] AC 31 at 39. 
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of the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament and popular support in New 
Zealand for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction. 
In Greenpeace the appellant organisation had signalled it would change 
its objects from “the promotion of peace and disarmament” – which had 
fallen foul of the political purpose exclusion before both the Charities 
Commission (the predecessor to the Charities Board) and the High 
Court – to “the promotion of nuclear disarmament and the elimination 
of all weapons of mass destruction”.55 This amendment satisfied the 
Court of Appeal since, in its view, the object was now sufficiently non-
controversial. But the Supreme Court, as we have seen, said this was 
the wrong litmus test:
Instead, assessment of whether advocacy or promotion of a cause or law 
reform is a charitable purpose depends on consideration of the end that 
is advocated, the means promoted to achieve that end and the manner in 
which the cause is promoted in order to assess whether the purpose can 
be said to be of public benefit within the spirit and intendment of the 
1601 Statute.56 
The trouble with a controversy criterion is, one would have thought, 
fairly obvious. Jonathan Garton, with perhaps a hint of hyperbole, 
contends: “Controversy alone simply cannot be an appropriate barometer 
for determining whether a particular purpose is political: if it were, there 
would be little, if anything, that could ever be charitable.”57 Returning to 
the actual objects in dispute in Greenpeace, the Supreme Court explained: 58
[T]he court would have no adequate means of judging the public benefit of 
such promotion of nuclear disarmament and elimination of all weapons 
of mass destruction, taking into account all the consequences, local and 
international. Whether promotion of these ideas is beneficial is a matter 
of opinion in which public benefit is not self-evident and which seems 
unlikely to be capable of demonstration by evidence. 
In their dissenting judgment, William Young and Arnold JJ held 
that political advocacy did debar an entity from being registered as a 
charity. Their reasoning, nonetheless, echoes that of the majority on the 
competency and desirability of judges evaluating the merits of a cause, 
whether controversial or otherwise: 59
[J]udges are usually not well-placed to determine whether the success 
of a particular cause would be in the public interest. This may be for 
reasons of institutional competence. By way of example, a dispute between 
Greenpeace and the chief executive of the Department of Internal Affairs 
under the Charities Act does not provide an ideal forum for determining 
the appropriate policies for New Zealand to adopt towards other states 
in relation to nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction. 
55 See Greenpeace, above n 10, at [4]–[7].
56 Greenpeace, above n 10, at [76] (emphasis added).
57 Public	Benefit	in	Charity	Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013) at 
206.
58 Above n 10 at [101] (emphasis added).
59 At [125] (emphasis added).
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Similar considerations may apply in relation to Greenpeace’s purpose 
of protecting the environment, a purpose which is closely intertwined 
with the advocacy of causes (for instance against genetic engineering) 
the worth of which are not easily determined by the courts. As well, and 
leaving aside the practical	difficulties	of	forming	a	judgment on such issues, 
a judge may feel that entering into such an inquiry lies outside the proper 
scope of the judicial role.
On Greenpeace’s refashioning of its objects to make them less 
controversial in order to regain its charitable status, the Supreme Court 
in polite but terse fashion scolded: “It is not clear why the change in 
Greenpeace’s objects was treated by the Court of Appeal as being so 
decisive in the result”60 and “the substitution of one abstract end for 
another does not provide sufficient answer.”61 
B	 Benefit	to	the	public	head	of	charity
Collins J saw the force of FF’s argument that advocacy “for its conception 
of the traditional family was analogous to organisations that have 
advocated for the ‘mental and moral improvement’ of society.”62  When 
it reconsidered FF’s eligibility, he emphasised that the Board must be 
scrupulously objective when undertaking the analogical exercise of 
comparing FF’s activities with entities that had been accepted as charitable 
under this head. With more than a hint of disapproval he added: 63
This exercise should not be conflated with a subjective assessment of 
the merits of Family First’s views. Members of the Charities Board 
may personally disagree with the views of Family First, but at the same 
time recognise there is a legitimate analogy between its role and those 
organisations that have been recognised as charities. Such an approach 
would be consistent with the obligation on members of the Charities 
Board to act with honesty, integrity and in good faith. 
C Advancement of education
Counsel for the Board insisted that FF’s publications were of “a tenacious 
and polemical character” marked by “indoctrination or dissemination 
of propaganda.”64 Yet the Board was forced to concede that at least one 
commissioned report – that by the New Zealand Institute of Economic 
Research (“The Value of Family: Fiscal Benefits of Marriage and Reducing 
Family Breakdown in New Zealand”) – contained significant original 
60 At [99].
61 At [100].
62 Family First, above n 4, at [87].
63 At [89] (emphasis added).
64 At [92]. The Board had used these pejorative expressions in its 
deregistration decision: Board at [66], [67] (by implication), [75]. 
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research.65  The Board, said the High Court, must reconsider its decision 
in light of this report.66
V Reflections on the Family First case
A The “traditional” or “nuclear” family
In my introduction I suggested that the Charities Board decision in Family 
First represented an expression of contemporary state antipathy to the 
“nuclear” family. The nuclear family is a relatively modern construct, 
for broader or extended forms of family structure have been common 
throughout recorded human history.  
In twenty-first century liberal democracies, the principal flag bearers 
for the traditional family are conservative religious communities. Among 
theists and the three global religions of the Book – Judaism, Christianity 
and Islam – the family has an elevated and foundational status.67  This 
is shared by the political philosophy of conservatism. Roger Scruton 
cautions:68
It hardly needs saying . . . that the support and protection of this institution 
[viz, the family] must be central to the conservative outlook, and that 
changes in the law which are calculated to loosen or abolish the obligations 
of family life, or which in other ways facilitate the channeling of libidinal 
impulse away from that particular form of union, will be accepted by 
conservatives only under the pressure of necessity. . . The family is the 
origin of self-respect, being the first institution through which the social 
world is perceived. It is also autonomous: a form of life which has no 
aim besides itself.
The common elements of the major Semitic faith traditions’ conception 
of the family are heterosexual parents and the procreation and nurture 
65 Family First, above n 4, at [93].
66 The author has written a report for FF, subsequent to the Board decision. 
Rex Ahdar, Killing Me Softy: Should Euthanasia Be Legalised? (Family First 
NZ, 2014) was published in early 2014, https://www.familyfirst.org.nz/
research/killing-me-softly/.
67 See generally Peggy Morgan and Clive Lawton (eds) Ethical Issues in Six 
Religious Traditions (Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 1996) at 
143–144 (Judaism); at 185–186 (Christianity) and 232–236 (Islam); Don S 
Browning, M Christian Green and John Witte Jr Sex, Marriage and Family 
in World Religions (Columbia University Press, New York, 2006). The 
Catechism of the Catholic Church [Liberia Editrice Vaticana] (Vatican, 1994) 
at para 2202 states: “A man and woman united in marriage together with 
children, form a family… It should be considered the normal reference 
point by which the different forms of family relationship are to be 
evaluated.”
68 The Meaning of Conservatism (revised 3rd ed, St Augustine’s Press, South 
Bend, Indiana, 2002) at 129–130.
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of the offspring of such lifelong opposite-sex unions. In Catholicism, 
for example: 69
It is in the family that the mutual giving of self on the part of man and 
woman united in marriage creates an environment of life in which 
children ‘develop their potentialities, become aware of their dignity 
and prepare to face their unique and individual destiny.’ … it proceeds 
[sic] in importance and value the functions that society and the State are 
called to perform. The family possesses inviolable rights and finds its 
legitimization in human nature and not in being recognized by the State. 
The family, then, does not exist for society or the State, but society and 
the State exist for the family.
The “nuclear” nature of the family (father, mother and dependent 
children) is not as central as the emphasis upon the family as timeless 
or, the preferred label, “traditional”. Many within Christianity, even 
conservative Protestantism,70 acknowledge that the nuclear family is 
neither as traditional nor biblical as conservative Christians maintain. 71 
Certainly, the recognition of grandparents and other close kin (uncles, 
aunts, cousins) within the notion of “family” is widely accepted in other 
sectors of theism, most notably Islam. 
Broader understandings of the family are common in non-Western 
communities. In Māori society, “the primary meaning of ‘whanau’—the 
one that springs first to mind for native speakers of Māori—is a group 
of relatives defined by reference to a recent ancestor, comprising several 
generations, several nuclear families and several households”.72  Indeed, 
the very breadth of the whanau has proved potentially problematic for 
Māori in the charitable context. Māori may jeopardise their eligibility 
for charitable status by reason that the beneficiaries of the charity are 
connected by blood ties (and other familial bonds) and thereby prima 
69 Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace Compendium of the Social Doctrine 
of the Church (United States Catholic Conference of Bishops, Washington 
DC, 2004) at §§ 212 and 214 (original italics omitted). The quoted sentence 
is from the Encyclical letter from John Paul II, Centesimus Annus (1 May 
1991).
70 See W Bradford Wilcox, Mark Chaves and David Franz “Focused on the 
Family? Religious Traditions, Family Discourse, and Pastoral Practice” 
(2004) 43 Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 491 at 493. The non-
Evangelical reader may not perceive the pun in the title. James Dobson’s 
Focus on the Family organisation is one of the largest and longest running 
Evangelical Christian organisations in the United States.
71 See eg Carolyn Osiek “The New Testament and the Family” in Lisa Cahill 
and Dietmar Mieth (eds) The Family Concilium 1995/4] (Orbis, Mary Knoll, 
NY, 1995) at 1–9. On conservative Christianity generally see Rex Ahdar 
Conservative Christians and the Law (Ashgate, Aldershot, 2001).
72 Jacinta Ruru “Kua tut te puehu, kia mau: Māori aspirations and family 
law policy” in Henaghan and Atkin, above n 37, 57 at 59.
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facie fail the “public benefit” test  (which contemplates benefits being 
general and indiscriminate in nature).73 
B Is the promotion of the traditional family too controversial to be 
the focus of charitable endeavour?
In one sense those who support and promote the traditional family and 
who adhere to conservative understandings of sex roles and parenting 
will never be deterred by the rulings of a governmental agency. But 
organisations that do wish to contribute to public debate and the shaping 
of public policy are vulnerable to legal determinations that curtail their 
activities in this kind of endeavour. The loss of charitable status and 
the financial and other benefits it brings is significant. Susan Barker 
comments: 74
Most charities that are denied registration struggle to survive: they 
struggle to challenge decisions of the regulator . . . ; they struggle to gain 
funding as busy funders rightly or wrongly restrict funding to registered 
charities only; they struggle with issues of confidence and credibility, as 
the reasons for having been rejected by their own regulator are difficult 
to communicate to their stakeholders.
One suspects Family First NZ is in this category: it is heavily dependent 
on giving, with “almost all of its income being derived from donations.“75 
It is salutary to see the Supreme Court firmly declaring that the 
controversial criterion is irrelevant. A brief look at the plethora of 
registered charities reveal many that have objects that are “controversial” 
in so far as 21st century “liberal” or “progressive” political and social 
sensibilities are concerned. Take, for example:
 • Family Life International NZ
 • Destiny Church Auckland Trust
 • Pregnancy Counselling Services
 • Society for the Promotion of Community Standards76
 • Maxim Institute77
73 Susan Barker, Michael Gousmett and Ken Lord The Law and Practice of 
Charities in New Zealand (Lexis Nexis NZ, Wellington, 2013) at 406–407; 
Kerry O’Halloran Charity Law and Social Inclusion: An International Study 
(Routledge, London, 2007) at 288. Fortunately, the Charities Act 2005, s 
5(2)(a) meets this concern: “However,– (a) the purpose of a trust, society, 
or institution is a charitable purpose under this Act if the purpose 
would satisfy the public benefit requirement apart from the fact that the 
beneficiaries of the trust, or the members of the society or institution, are 
related by blood”.
74 Barker, above n 2, at 87.
75 Family First, above n 4, at [16]. In the 2013 financial year, donations to it 
came to $371,138.
76 CC20268, registered 17 December 2007.
77 CC24446, registered 16 May 2008.
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Family Life International is a Roman Catholic organisation whose 
aim is “to promote the full dignity and wonder of human life (from the 
moment of natural conception to the moment of natural death), of human 
sexuality, of marriage and family, and to inform and protect kiwi women 
and their babies from the harm of abortion.”78 Aside from the notorious 
extravagance of the Destiny Church’s79 leadership, this indigenous 
Pentecostal church has been an outspoken opponent of gay rights.80 
Pregnancy Counselling Services81 is listed on the Pro-Life NZ website 
and is primarily tasked with counselling women to think seriously 
about options other than abortion should they want to discontinue their 
pregnancy.82 The Society for the Promotion of Community Standards, 
founded by Patricia Bartlett in 1970, and claiming a membership of 21,000 
by 1975,83 has been relatively quiet in recent years, but a generation 
ago it was a regular and vocal critic of the “permissive society” (as it 
would term it) viz, public nudity and pornography, films and television 
programmes that portrayed too much violence and sex, the legalisation 
of prostitution and so on.84 Despite a massive sea change in cultural 
terms, it still fights the good fight today: “Our ‘fight’ is with those who 
are perpetually engaged in forcing back the moral boundaries”85. The 
Maxim Institute is a conservative think tank that champions neo-liberal 
economic measures (such as combatting welfare dependency), defending 
parental rights and so on.86 
C “Political correctness” at work?
A great deal of the analysis of . . . family problems is couched in terms of 
the ‘decline’ or ‘collapse’ of ‘The Family’. It is only by grasping that “The 
Family” does not exist, that the ideological nature of such analyses can be 
recognized. . . . ‘The Nuclear Family’ does not exist except as a powerful 
image in the minds of most people. . . . traditional views of ‘The Family’ 
have been conservative, racist, classist, and heterosexist.  In developing 
new forms of theorizing and a new postmodern sociology of family living, 
a key strategy is that of exploring a wide range of values.87
78 From its website: <http://www.fli.org.nz/about>.
79 CC22039, registered 30 June 2008. That Church’s other “branches” at 
Wellington, Hamilton, Christchurch and so on were also registered on 
that same date.
80 See eg “Protesters hold up Destiny Church march” New Zealand Herald, 
7 March 2005.  For a (rare) academic analysis see Peter Lineham Destiny: 
The Life and Times of a Self-Made Apostle (Penguin, Auckland, 2013).
81 CC2976, registered 30 June 2008.
82 See the Pro-Life NZ website: <http://prolife.org.nz/pregnancysupport/>
83 Laurie Guy, Shaping Godzone: Public Issues and Church Voices in New Zealand 
1840–2000 (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 2001) at 368.
84 Its early years (1970–1995) are recounted in Carolyn Moynihan A Stand 
for Decency (SPCS, 1995) and Guy, ibid, ch 18.
85 From its website: <http://www.spcs.org.nz/about/>.
86 See is website < http://www.maxim.org.nz/about_us/overview3.aspx>.
87 Jon Benards, ”We Must Not Define ‘The Family’!” in Barbara Settles et 
al (ed) Concepts	and	Definitions	of	the	Family	for	the	21st	Century	(Howarth 
Press, Binghamton, NY, 1991) 21 at 22, 23 and 33.
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Political correctness is a much used and abused term and I invoke 
it here with some trepidation, acknowledging that it “is a complex, 
discontinuous, and protean phenomenon which has changed radically, 
even over the past two decades.”88 Nonetheless, I will take as a starting 
point Geoffrey Hughes’ broad elucidation that: “Political correctness is 
based on various idealistic assumptions on how society should be run 
and how people should behave towards each other.”89 Similarly, Erich 
Kolig explains: 90
Political correctness is the self-cleansing mechanism of hegemony, a 
palliative of conscience, the practical arm of self-righteousness. Practically, 
it means conforming with meaning-makers and opinion-manufacturers 
who enjoy popular currency at the moment. . . . In a pluralistic and 
democratic form of society such as exists in New Zealand, there is at any 
time a plethora of opinions and view, ethical points of view and the like 
abound. This fact should neither surprise nor overwhelm. The interesting 
question is why, in this multitudinous mix, do some meaning-makers and 
some opinions rise to prominence and, what is more, to social dominance, 
while others fail.
A “primary idealistic assumption” of political correctness, contends 
Hughes, “is that of equality.”91 This is manifested in myriad ways, but, 
for present purposes, it leads ineluctably to pluriform conceptions of the 
family. To preserve the equal status and dignity of persons of different 
genders, sexual orientations and so on – who come together to form this 
entity – one needs “families”, plural. As Henaghan notes:92
Based on ideas of equality, non-discrimination and a political assumption 
of social expectations, a wide variety of family structure are being accepted 
into the mainstream definition of the legal family, whether they want to 
be or not. Such a policy change, as with all policy changes, is likely to 
create winners and losers.
In contrast, a single definition that presupposes there is something 
called the family is exclusive not inclusive, monolithic not diverse, 
oppressive not facilitative. To promote a concept of the family as the 
optimal model is dangerously narrow and judgmental, if not downright 
anti-social. 
Modern liberalism’s stance toward the family concurs: the nuclear 
family unit of married heterosexual husband and wife and dependent 
children cannot be an exhaustive definition. Invoking liberal philosopher 
Joseph Raz’s notion of “value pluralism”, Andrew Bainham, for example, 
argues that this “implies that all those intimate and family relationships 
88 Geoffrey Hughes Political Correctness: A History of Semantics and Culture 
(Wiley-Blackwell, Chichester, UK, 2010) at 3.
89 At 21.
90 “Of Condoms, Biculturalism and Political Correctness: The Maori 
Renaissance and Cultural Politics in New Zealand” (2000) 46 Paiduma 
231 at 246.
91 Hughes, above n 88, at 21.
92 Henaghan, above n 37, at 24.
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which can be considered valuable should be supported by the state 
in an even-handed way. No particular form of relationship or family 
arrangement should be officially promoted.”93 So, for example, same-
sex partners (married or unmarried, with or without children) ought 
to be considered, in law, a family.94 As Baroness Hale of Richmond, 
writing extra-judicially, observed: “Non-traditional families of so many 
kinds are so common that it is difficult to argue that a proper way to 
protect the traditional family is to deny all recognition to other kinds 
of relationship.”95 Increasingly, legal theorists question the continued 
right of the state “to regulate families qua families, and to encourage or 
discourage certain kinds of familial relationships.”96 In this vein, Alice 
Ristroph and Melissa Murray, for example, mounted a tentative case 
for familial “disestablishment”: in the same way the American state is 
constrained under the First Amendment from establishing a religion, it 
ought to also be curtailed from endorsing and supporting a specific vision 
or model of the family, such as the “marital, nuclear family”.97
To refer to the family, as Family First do, with loaded epithets such as 
“nuclear”, “traditional” and “natural” is to provoke irritation, if not anger. 
Is not “tradition” associated with Victorian, patriarchal, hierarchical and 
thus oppressive forms? The word “nuclear” even carries an air of odium 
since – although clearly not used here in a scientific, industrial or military 
sense – it jars in the ears of enlightened New Zealand citizens wedded to 
a nuclear-free society. The word ”natural” could, in other contemporary 
contexts, be a “virtue” word.98 It resonates with a clean, green and 
unpolluted environment and foods or products produced therefrom are 
usually unhesitatingly prized. But in the context of domestic and familial 
structures, it is a “vice” or taboo word, for it implies that forms other 
than the natural model are perforce “unnatural”. To describe a family 
form as unnatural is to pass judgment based on outdated and bigoted 
views on just what marriage, procreation and parenting are all about. 
VI Conclusion
Promoting the traditional nuclear family is not an uncharitable exercise. 
That is the way it should be. Furthermore, after the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Greenpeace, the controversial nature of a charity’s aims is 
not a bar ipso facto to its legal recognition. Again, this is a correct 
conclusion. This is an even more sound position given the vulnerability 
93 “Family Rights in the Next Millennium” (2000) 53 Current Legal Problems 
471 at 475.
94 See eg Ruthann Robson “Resisting the Family: Repositioning Lesbians in 
Legal Theory” (1994) 19 Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 
975 at 975.
95 “Homosexual Rights” [2004] Child & Family LQ 125 at 130.
96 “Disestablishing the Family” (2010) 119 Yale LJ 1236 at 1240.
97 Ibid.
98 Peter Westen “‘Freedom’ and ‘Coercion’ – Virtue Words and Vice Words” 
[1985] Duke LJ 541.
Charity begins at the politically correct home? The Family First case
Otago Law Review188 (2015) Vol 14 No 1
of charities whose objectives appear, to liberal minds, to be antiquated 
and antediluvian. Conservative organisations overseas have been wont 
to cry that they are the target of officialdom. For example, in the United 
States, the Tea Party and other avowedly conservative non-profit groups, 
were, it seems, singled out for scrutiny from the Internal Revenue Service 
and subjected to an auditing to ascertain whether they still merited 
tax-exempt status.99 Family First might feel similarly victimised here. 
However, this case alone is flimsy evidence to pronounce any such 
sweeping charge. Moreover, one only has to note that that the leading 
case, Greenpeace, involved a quintessential “progressive” entity, one 
situated at the other end of the political spectrum.
Interestingly, the Charities Board in deregistering Family First cited Re 
Collier (Deceased) several times.100 It is a shame it did not also quote this 
passage from Hammond J:101 
All would surely agree that a bequest for bringing about revolution, or 
outright disobedience of the law must be illegal; and hence it could not 
be charitable. But once Courts are beyond those concerns, the debate 
becomes much more difficult . . .  in making decisions in an area like this, 
[ie, ‘charitable trusts [being] those for the advocacy of a particular point of 
view or ‘propaganda’ trusts as they are sometimes pejoratively termed’] 
Judges are, in reality, making decisions about the ‘worth’ of a particular 
bequest. The argument is that judges’ views on (say) temperance, or birth 
control, or euthanasia, do reflect an assumption as to ‘worth’ and that 
that affects outcomes. . . . 
I have to say that I have considerable sympathy for that viewpoint which 
holds that a Court does not have to enter into the debate at all. . . . Rather, 
the function of the Court ought to be to sieve out debates which are for 
improper purposes: and to then leave the public debate to lie where it falls, 
in the public arena.
Family First NZ was put to considerable expense to preserve its 
charitable status. “Charities are reluctant litigants” as Barker, Gousmett 
and Lord note, for litigation will typically draw from the precious 
donated funds that have been earmarked for the beneficial tasks these 
entities have set themselves.102 At the time of writing, FF still had not 
received the benefit of the reassessment by the Charities Board that the 
High Court mandated,103 although for now its registration is intact.  
99 Juliet Eilpern “IRS targeted groups critical of government, documents 
from agency probe show”, Washington Post, 12 May 2013; Jackie Calmes 
“Senate Report cites IRS Mismanagement in Targeting of Tea Party 
Groups” New York Times, 5 August 2015.
100 Re Collier [1998] 1 NZLR 91 was cited in the Board decision, above n 9, at 
footnotes 33, 39, 40, 43, 80 and 107.
101 Re Collier, ibid, at 90 (italics supplied). The excerpt I have inserted in the 
square brackets is from the preceding paragraph at the same page.
102 Barker et al, above n 73, at 701.
103 Email by Bob McCoskrie, National Director of Family First New Zealand, 
to author (14 October 2015) (on file with author).
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A final point. In Aid/Watch the majority of the High Court of Australia 
approved the notion that “the generation of lawful means of public 
debate” on a particular subject (in that instance, the effectiveness of 
foreign aid in the relief of poverty) was “itself a purpose beneficial to 
the community within the fourth head [of charity] in Pemsel.”104 In this 
vein Professor Matthew Harding observes:105
If the pursuit of political purposes tends to produce a culture of free 
political expression and therefore tends to sustain and augment conditions 
under which democratic government can flourish, there are reasons to 
think that the pursuit of such purposes by ‘not for profit’ organisations 
tends to make a distinctive contribution to such a culture.
The question whether the promotion of the traditional family is 
worthwhile should be a matter, as Hammond J said, of public debate to 
be left where it falls, in the public arena. To effectively silence voices in 
public debate that are controversial or unfashionable by deregistering 
them as a charity is regrettable, a loss for democratic discourse – and, in 
the end, a loss for us all.
104 Aid/Watch Inc v Commissioner of Taxation [2010] HCA 42 at [47]. This passage 
was quoted without comment by the majority of the Supreme Court in 
Greenpeace, above n 10, at [67]. 
105 Charity Law and the Liberal State (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2014) at 191.
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